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For nearly two decades, the group of emerg-
ing-market countries increased its holdings of 
liquid foreign exchange reserves, both in dollar 
terms and relative to domestic incomes. That 
trend accelerated in the early 2000s, but it may be 
ending now as the emerging economies struggle 
in the backwash of the global financial crisis and 
economic slowdown. In the mid-2000s, liquid-
ity was abundant in the world economy, but 
recently there has been an acute global shortage 
of dollar liquidity. Recent declines in emerging 
market international reserves are directly related 
to this shortage.
Reserve developments for three large emerg-
ing economies, the Russian Federation, India, 
and Korea, illustrate this story. The reserves of all 
three countries peaked and then began to decline 
in the summer of 2008. In particular, Russia’s 
huge holdings—second in dollar terms only to 
those of China and Japan—have plummeted by 
about a quarter since reaching their oil-driven 
peak in July 2008.1 There are many other exam-
ples beyond these three especially dramatic ones; 
1 See the online Appendix (http://www.aeaweb.org/arti-
cles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.99.2.480) for figure of the reserves. 
The Russian situation was exacerbated by noneconomic 
fundamentals (political risk), most notably following the 
invasion of Georgia in August 2008. The Russian data are 
also obfuscated by occasional replenishments of the central 
bank’s reserves by drawing from the country’s Sovereign 
Wealth Fund (SWF). The fungibility of central bank and 
SWF assets, and the rapidly growing size of SWF hoards, 
will likely complicate measurement even further in future.
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often, however, the percentage reserve losses are 
smaller (so far) and start later (for example, after 
the September 2008 Lehman Brothers collapse). 
The Russian, Indian, and Korean currencies have 
all depreciated against the United States dollar 
since the summer of 2008, with Korea’s declin-
ing most dramatically, to levels not seen since the 
Asian crisis of the late 1990s.
Before the recent crisis, commentary on the 
emerging-market reserve buildup focused on 
the possibility that reserve stocks might have 
reached “excessive” levels. Certainly some 
countries’ reserve levels far exceeded the levels 
needed to counter fluctuations in export earn-
ings, and often even covered the possibility that 
short-term external debt might not be rolled over 
(the so-called “Guidotti-Greenspan” prescrip-
tion for reserve adequacy). Economic analysis of 
optimal reserve levels has a long history, going 
back at least to the writing of Henry Thornton 
(1802) at the start of the nineteenth century. In 
recent work, we have followed Thornton’s lead, 
arguing that governments—especially those of 
emerging markets—view reserves as protection 
against “double-drain” crisis scenarios in which 
banking and currency problems interact in ways 
likely to cause sharp and disruptive external 
currency depreciation.2
In a specific crisis scenario, investor fear 
of currency depreciation leads to a run out of 
domestic deposits, pressuring banks and trig-
gering lender-of-last-resort liquidity (LLR) pro-
vision by the monetary authorities. This LLR 
support, however, magnifies the potential claims 
on official foreign exchange reserves, and hence 
magnifies the currency depreciation that results 
when the reserves are expended to support the 
2 See Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor (2008). Similar 
theoretical ideas have been discussed in the crisis literature, 
for example by Guillermo A. Calvo (1996). See Obstfeld et 
al. for a review of the literature. Olivier Jeanne (2007) sur-
veys recent commentary and analysis regarding emerging-
market reserves.
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exchange rate. It follows that reserve levels may 
have to be quite large if the banking system is 
highly developed and the government hopes to 
resist sharp currency depreciation in a potential 
crisis. Official fear of abrupt depreciation may 
be due to dollarized financial liabilities, rapid 
pass-through to inflation, or other factors dis-
cussed in the “fear of floating” literature.
The utility of foreign exchange reserves is 
articulated by the International Monetary Fund 
(2008, 37) in a recent overview: “[I]n the face 
of sharp capital outflows, countries will need to 
respond quickly to ensure adequate liquidity and 
deal with emerging problems in weaker institu-
tions. The exchange rate should be allowed to 
absorb some of the pressure, but stockpiles of 
reserves provide room for intervention to avoid 
disorderly market conditions.”
I. Financial Stability and Reserves in the Data
In Obstfeld et al. (2008) we argue that a con-
siderable share of the reserve accumulation in 
recent years can be explained as an attempt 
by central banks to insure against this sort of 
financial instability. Importantly, the financial 
shock we consider is not simply a “sudden stop,” 
in which case countries would need to hold 
reserves only in proportion to their short-term 
external debt. Rather, internal sources of finan-
cial instability also can be critical. As a result, 
when a country has open financial markets and 
desires exchange rate stability, it needs to hold 
reserves proportional to the size of its banking 
system.
Specifically, we show that the reserves/
GDP ratio is a function of financial openness, 
the exchange rate regime, and monetary depth 
(M2/GDP ratio). Despite the focus on the 
Guidotti-Greenspan rule and sudden stops in 
the literature, short-term external debt is not a 
significant predictor of reserve holdings, though 
another variable often considered in more tradi-
tional models, the Trade/GDP ratio, is.3 Thus, 
3 For a review of the recent empirical literature, see 
Obstfeld et al. (2008). Joshua Aizenman and Nancy Marion 
(2003) have argued the buildup of reserves in East Asia 
can be seen as precautionary savings, and Aizenman and 
Jaewoo Lee (2007) argue that precautionary, not mercan-
tilist, reasons can explain the reserves buildup. Relative to 
these papers, we focus more on the size of the domestic 
financial system, as opposed to fear of sudden stops.
a specification that combines our basic “finan-
cial stability” variables (financial openness, 
exchange rate regime, and financial depth) 
with Trade/GDP does a good job of explaining 
reserve behavior.4
One other factor that is consistently significant 
is a dummy for the advanced countries (AD). 
These countries hold fewer reserves than their 
M2/GDP, Trade/GDP, exchange rate regime, 
and financial openness suggest they should. 
This is true even when we control for the ability 
to issue debt in one’s own currency, or “original 
sin.” The sin variable has a significant and posi-
tive coefficient.
In this paper, rather than focusing entirely on 
the emerging market (EM) sample (as in our 
previous work), we now include AD countries. 
While the puzzle of reserve buildup was primar-
ily an EM issue, the current crisis is one that 
clearly touches both EM and AD countries. Thus, 
our predictive work below will be limited to that 
sample. The regression we use includes only our 
financial variables over the period where “sin” 
data are available (1993–2005). The regression 
we use to predict reserve holdings is:5
(1) ln(Res/GdP) = −6.514 + 1.047 FinOpen
 + 0.224 Peg
 + 0.187 softPeg
 + 0.604 ln(M2/GdP)
 −1.098 Ad
 + 1.498 sin.
II. Implications for Today
What can our positive empirical model tell 
us about reserves, central bank swaps of foreign 
currency, and exchange rates during the recent 
financial panic? We want to know how actual 
reserve holdings on the eve of the crisis com-
pare to what our model would predict, to see if 
countries were “underinsured” or “overinsured.” 
4 See Obstfeld et al. (2008) for details on data, sample, 
estimation methodology, robustness, and full analysis. 
5 All coefficients are significant at 95 percent except 
“peg,” which is significant at 90 percent. See the online 
Appendix for details.
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Thus, we first generate predicted values for 
reserve-to-GDP ratios in 2005. We then adjust 
those ratios for M2/GDP changes in the last 
two years to get approximate predicted values 
for 2007, since M2 growth is the main regressor 
that changes at high frequency in our sample. 
(More details are shown in Appendix Table 1.)
For the year 2007, EM countries were pre-
dicted to hold substantial reserves; predicted 
ratios are quite high (20 percent of GDP on aver-
age) relative to those of AD countries (9 per-
cent). Some have accumulated far beyond these 
levels, especially between 2005 and 2007. By 
2007, actual reserves were 26 percent of GDP 
on average for EM countries.6 For example, in 
2005, China’s predicted reserves were 29 per-
cent of GDP while actual reserves were 37 per-
cent. China held more reserves than expected, 
but not dramatically so. By 2007, however, 
predicted reserves had not moved much, but 
China’s actual reserves were up to 47 percent of 
GDP. Likewise Malaysia, Singapore, and Korea 
were all predicted to have reserves of 20 percent 
of GDP or more, but actual levels were substan-
tially higher. Also, countries like Brazil or India 
that were at or below predicted levels in 2005 
were above them by 2007. The model predicts 
the variation across these countries reasonably 
well. The correlation of predicted and actual 
reserve/GDP ratio is 0.68.
On the other hand, many advanced countries 
held fewer reserves than our model predicts.7 
Australia, the United Kingdom, and Canada all 
hold considerably fewer reserves than expected. 
What if we do not think advanced countries 
should hold fewer reserves than other coun-
tries? That is, what if we run the regression 
above without the AD dummy? Then, the pre-
dicted values suggest the advanced countries 
should be holding larger stocks of reserves than 
they actually own (predicted 14 percent versus 
actual 10 percent). In this exercise we also find 
that Denmark, Sweden, and New Zealand are 
holding fewer reserves than the typical coun-
try with their characteristics. Only Japan holds 
6 Hong Kong and Singapore are both predicted to, and 
do, hold far more reserves than other countries. Excluding 
them, the predicted reserve ratio for the group is 17 percent 
of GDP and the actual is 21 percent.
7 Due to a lack of individual country reserve holdings or 
M2, euro-area countries are not included in the analysis of 
predicted reserves.
 substantially more reserves than the predicted 
value suggests they would.8
III. Currency Pressure versus the War Chests in 
the Panic of 2008
Echoing Thornton, our theoretical model 
assumes that it is in the event of a panic that 
reserves will be used to quell M2 flight and 
avert depreciation. It is natural to ask whether 
this mechanism was at work in 2008: were 
exchange rates better stabilized in countries 
with more reserves relative to M2?—or, to be 
more faithful to the multivariate model, with 
more reserves relative to what the model would 
have predicted?
Figure 1 addresses the first of these ques-
tions with a simple scatter of percentage depre-
ciation of the currency against the US dollar in 
the year 2008 (up to 12/15 at time of writing) 
versus the country’s reserves/M2 ratio at the 
end of 2007. The sample is restricted to just the 
emerging countries, as our regressions suggest 
that advanced countries have an intrinsically 
smaller need for reserves due to, say, more pol-
icy credibility and certainty, or better access to 
private credit or official swap lines. The scatter 
shows that countries with feebler war chests at 
the end of 2007 suffered larger currency crashes 
in 2008, offering preliminary support for our 
arguments.
We explore this relationship further (table in 
online Appendix) and add some controls. The 
bivariate relationship is only borderline signifi-
cant. In contrast to common arguments regard-
ing the perils of financial openness, currency 
values of more financially open economies were 
steadier in 2008, hinting at reverse causality 
from (more) financial stability to (more) open-
ness. Finally, lagged current account deficit as a 
share of GDP was not a highly statistically sig-
nificant influence in this sample, once we con-
trol for the size of the reserve war chest.9
8 Iceland’s predicted reserves are lower than some other 
countries because their financial account is coded as less 
open than other advanced countries in the Edwards mea-
sure. The Chinn-Ito index also codes Iceland as more closed 
than other advanced nations.
9 We also experimented with lagged short-term debt-to-
GDP ratio as an extra regressor, to address the claim that 
rollover problems might exacerbate depreciation, but we 
found its coefficient always had the wrong (negative) sign, 
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Table 1, takes the next step of using, not actual 
2007 reserves as a control variable, but the ratio 
of actual reserves to what our preferred model 
would have predicted. We now see whether 
“underinsurance” (as judged by our positive 
model) was associated with larger deprecia-
tions in 2008. Indeed, it was in all samples once 
we exclude an influential extreme outlier—the 
infamous case of Iceland. In columns 2 through 
4, which unlike column 1 exclude Iceland, the 
relationship between low reserves and high 
depreciation is clear. Actual relative to predicted 
reserves is significant at the 1 percent level in 
the full and AD samples, and at the 10 percent 
level in the more noisy EM sample. In column 
5, this result is again robust to the inclusion of 
the lagged current account surplus to GDP ratio, 
which is once more statistically insignificant 
(though of the expected sign).
As a convenient graphical summary of our 
argument, we present a scatterplot of actual 
depreciation in 2008 versus our model’s actual/
predicted reserve ratio for the AD and EM 
sample. This is shown in Figure 2, with Iceland 
excluded from the line of best fit, as in column 
2. The results are quite striking: international 
reserves did provide effective insurance against 
so that bigger debts appeared to be related to smaller depre-
ciations, contradicting the theory.
currency instability, for advanced and emerging 
countries alike.
IV. Central Bank Currency Swaps in the  
Panic of 2008
This crisis has also generated one of the most 
notable examples of central bank cooperation in 
history—the large swap lines set up between a 
number of central banks.10 The Federal Reserve 
extended large swap lines to major industrial-
country central banks first (European Central 
Bank, Bank of Japan, Bank of England, and 
Swiss National Bank) starting in 2007; then, in 
the fall of 2008, extended those to nearly every 
advanced economy; and finally, on October 
29, 2008, granted similar arrangements to four 
major emerging market countries (Brazil, Korea, 
Mexico, and Singapore).11
In these swaps, the Fed has provided dollar 
liquidity to the other central banks, allowing 
these central banks, in turn, to provide dollars 
to their own domestic banking systems. Why 
are such swap lines needed? Two alternatives for 
the provision of dollar liquidity in the  foreign 
10 See Brad Setser (2008) for real-time commentary on 
the extraordinary nature of the measures.
11 See http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/ 
monetary/20081029b.htm and links therein for press 
releases on the swap lines.
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 country would be (i) for the foreign central 
bank to provide the domestic currency and let 
the bank sell the local currency for dollars on 
the open market, or (ii) for the foreign central 
bank to use its own dollar reserves to provide 
the liquidity. The former would put downward 
pressure on the local currency and the latter 
would possibly exhaust the central bank’s dollar 
reserves. Examining current reserve holdings 
relative to our positive model’s predictions is a 
useful way to provide some empirical context 
for these swap lines.
The size of the swap lines available has varied 
across countries, and for the major industrialized 
country central banks eventually became unlim-
ited. The ECB and SNB also instituted smaller 
swap lines, in their own currencies, with a num-
ber of smaller European countries.12 In Table 2, 
we show actual and predicted reserves/GDP as 
well as actual reserves in dollars, the gap in our 
model between actual and predicted (in dollars), 
and the size of the initial swap lines.
The swaps were clearly large in magnitude for 
many advanced countries. For every advanced 
country except Japan, the size of the swap was 
exceeded 50 percent of actual reserves held and 
in the cases of the UK, Australia, and the ECB, 
12 See Ingo Fender and Jacob Gyntelberg (2008) for 
discussion. Data for the size of the swaps are taken from 
there. 
the swap was larger than existing reserves.13 
In addition, for countries such as Denmark, 
Sweden, and New Zealand, not only was the 
swap line nearly as big as existing reserves, but 
it was larger than the gap with our model’s pre-
diction. On the other hand, in some cases the 
swap line was still too small to plug the gap rel-
ative to predicted reserves. Australia, Canada, 
and the United Kingdom all still have fewer 
reserves than predicted, even counting the swap 
(and not counting the decline in their reserves in 
2008 thus far).
In contrast, the swaps to emerging countries 
are never larger than 50 percent of their actual 
reserves. Further, in most cases, the coun-
try already had more reserves than predicted. 
Korea’s was $30 billion, though the country 
already had $260 billion. For Singapore the fig-
ure was $30 billion against $162 billion already 
held, and Brazil received $30 billion versus 
$180 billion on hand. It is hard to see how these 
magnitudes could be very meaningful; instead, 
these swap lines could be interpreted as signals. 
For Mexico and Hungary, the swaps are more 
substantial relative to actual reserves, and those 
two countries were holding fewer reserves than 
13 Detailed information on reserves on the Bank of 
England Web site shows currency composition of reserves, 
and this reveals that the BoE holdings of US dollars was 
much smaller than the total reserves; by the time the swap 
line was instituted, the BoE was down to less than $10 bil-
lion in US dollar reserves.





Ex. Iceland EM only
AD and EM
Ex. Iceland
Sample (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Actual/predicted reserves −2.56 −8.90*** −13.08*** −5.27* −7.67**
(6.64) (2.42) (1.22) (2.76) (3.01)
Current account surplus/GDP −0.24
(0.25)
Constant 21.21*** 27.17*** 32.17** 22.25*** 25.72***
(7.29) (4.03) (5.60) (5.18) (4.40)
Observations 39 38 9 29 38
R2 0.01 0.20 0.56 0.06 0.22
Notes: The dependent variable is percent change in the local currency price of one dollar from 12/31/07 to 12/15/08 (+ = 
depreciation). All independent variables take their 2007 values. The samples include advanced (AD) and/or emerging (EM). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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 predicted, so the swap lines may have had a 
more substantive impact beyond mere signaling 
in those cases.
Thus, even with nearly a trillion dollars com-
mitted, in some cases the Fed’s action was primar-
ily symbolic because the foreign country already 
had so many dollars. In other cases, the swap may 
have been quite important, but the scale required 
for effective lending is not available to organiza-
tions such as the IMF or other multilateral agen-
cies. Only the world’s largest central banks can 
intervene on such a scale. Some players (such as 








reserves Gap in $B FED swap ECB swap
Country (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Brazil 13.7 13.1 $180.31 $8.79 $30.00
Hungary 17.4 19.0 $24.06 −$2.15 € 5.00
Korea, Rep. 27.1 19.4 $262.53 $74.65 $30.00
Mexico 9.8 11.5 $87.21 −$15.90 $30.00
Poland 15.6 12.7 $65.72 $12.22 € 10.00
Singapore 101.0 30.4 $162.91 $113.93 $30.00
Australia 3.3 7.1 11.3 $26.91 −$65.86 $30.00
Canada 3.1 10.5 11.2 $41.07 −$107.73 $30.00
Denmark 11.1 9.5 16.4 $34.32 −$16.28 $15.00 € 15.00
Iceland 13.5 4.5 10.0 $2.63 $0.68 € 1.50
Japan 22.2 5.6 4.7 $973.36 $766.33 $120.00
New Zealand 13.3 12.3 18.4 $17.25 −$6.50 $15.00
Sweden 7.0 7.0 12.5 $31.03 −$24.36 $30.00
Switzerland 18.1 14.0 20.0 $75.17 −$8.14 $60.00
United Kingdom 2.1 15.6 21.9 $57.28 −$540.35 $80.00
United States 2.0 2.8 1.9 $277.52 $15.87
ECB 1.8 $215.56 $240.00
Notes: First four columns are for 2007. Columns 1–3 are in percentages, columns 4–6 are in billions of dollars, and column 
7 is in billions of euros. Gap in reserves (column 5) uses the predicted reserves based on the ratio from column 3 for the 
advanced countries, the higher estimate for reserves needs. Swap line amounts from Fender and Gyntelberg (2008). Swap 
lines in italics were eventually uncapped, providing effectively infinite resources if the country chooses to use them. They 
are listed at the size prior to uncapping.
source: WDI data and authors’ calculations. 
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China and India) do have foreign reserves suf-
ficient to allow them to act as crisis lenders to 
foreign governments, but so far such actions have 
been limited, for example, Nordic central banks 
lending euros to Iceland and Japan’s offer of $100 
billion in resources to the IMF.
The swap lines also have implications for 
reserve holdings. One could argue that the 
expectation that such swap lines could be avail-
able rationalizes advanced countries’ decisions 
to hold fewer reserves than other countries. 
This would suggest EM countries will continue 
to hold large reserves until they are confident 
that they will have access to substantial foreign 
exchange swaps when in need. Alternatively, 
these extraordinary measures may have been 
just that—extraordinary. The advanced coun-
tries may now recognize this and increase their 
reserves stocks (or in some cases adopt the euro 
to reduce the need for reserves). An increase in 
IMF resources could also be in the cards.
V. Conclusion
International reserves are in some ways the 
ultimate rainy day fund for a country. They are 
hard, liquid assets that have value in times of 
need. The Panic of 2008 is more than a rainy 
day: it is a torrential downpour. Elsewhere we 
have argued that reserve holdings are strongly 
connected to the size of the banking system. 
Countries insure not just against an end of for-
eign financial inflows, but also against runs on 
the currency by domestic savers. Here we show 
that interpreting reserve holdings in this manner 
is helpful for understanding reserve adequacy 
and countries’ seemingly different abilities to 
weather the current storm.
Currencies of countries holding more reserves 
relative to M2—and in particular, more reserves 
relative to our measure of predicted reserves based 
on financial motives—have tended to appreciate 
in the crisis. Those of countries with smaller war 
chests have depreciated. Understanding these 
motives for reserve demand also shows that cen-
tral bank swap lines to some smaller advanced 
countries have been sizable as a share of current 
and needed reserves. For most EM countries, 
though, the swaps have been largely symbolic. 
The scale of reserves needed to backstop emerg-
ing markets simply surpasses the resources of the 
multilateral organizations and all but the largest 
reserves holders in the world.
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